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In Norms and Necessity, Amie Thomasson once again displays all the philosophical virtues that 
have made her into one of the most exciting philosophers living today. She possesses a great 
knowledge of the philosophical tradition, she tackles some of the most important philosophical 
questions in a clear and lucid manner, and actually goes into detailed dialogue with conflicting 
views. It is also her most ambitious book so far. Questions about modality are at the centre of 
many philosophical debates, ranging from the philosophy of language and logic to the 
philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophical methodology. Therefore, 
Thomasson’s book will be of interest not only to specialists in the epistemology and 
metaphysics of modality, but to anyone who wishes to stay updated about the most important 
recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
Thomasson defends a position called Modal Normativism, which holds that the function of 
modal claims is to express or renegotiate norms. Such a non-descriptivist account of modality 
has historical roots in the work of philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle, Sellars, and 
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has been more recently defended by Simon Blackburn and Robert Brandom. Thomasson 
focuses on metaphysical modality, and argues that the function of metaphysical modal 
statements is to convey or renegotiate the semantic rules that govern our terms, while staying 
in the object-language. Her account avoids heavyweight ontological commitments, demystifies 
metaphysical knowledge by re-describing it as the explicit knowledge of the implicit semantic 
rules that govern our terms, sometimes in combination with straightforward empirical 
information when the terms are governed by world-deferential rules (e.g. the rule ‘Apply the 
term ‘water’ to whatever shares the same chemical substance with this’), and leads to a re-
interpretation of the study of metaphysics as a descriptive and revisionary conceptual enterprise. 
Chapter 1 (‘The Rise and Fall of Early Non-Descriptive Approaches’) contains an excellent 
overview of the history of modal normativism as well as the traditional objections it faced. 
Thomasson outlines four main obstacles: (1) the traditional problems of conventionalism; (2) 
the Frege-Geach problem; (3) de re and a posteriori necessities; (4) Quine’s and other more 
recent attacks on analyticity (to which she has responded in earlier work). The discussion of 
traditional conventionalism already occurs in the first chapter of the book. Thomasson’s 
response to the Frege-Geach problem is based on a distinction between the meaning, use and 
function of modal discourse (developed in chapter 2 ‘The Function of Modal Discourse’ and 
chapter 3 ‘The Meaning of Modal Discourse’). De re and a posteriori necessities are addressed 
in chapter 4 (‘Handling De Re and A Posteriori Modal Claims’), which is one of the highlights 
of the book. Chapter 5 ‘Other Objections to Modal Normativism’ contains a response to some 
further objections, including the problem of ‘necessary existents’, modal demonstratives and 
certain circularity worries. After having dealt with the objections against modal normativism, 
Thomasson argues for the ontological, epistemological and methodological advantages her 
view offers (respectively chapter 6, 7 and 8). 
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I will make two remarks. My first concerns Thomasson’s relation to Brandom’s account of 
modality, which is (as Thomasson concedes) similar to her own position. In his Between Saying 
and Doing (2008), Brandom further develops Sellars’ (Kantian) claim that “[t]he language of 
modality is […] a “transposed” language of norms” (in Sellars’ 1953 ‘Inference and Meaning’ 
article). In Brandom’s terminology, normative vocabulary is a pragmatically mediated 
metavocabulary for modal vocabulary: it explicitly specifies certain practical abilities necessary 
for meaningfully deploying modal vocabulary in the first place. Thomasson refers to Brandom 
and states that “[h]e draws no firm distinction between what we normally think of as 
metaphysical necessities (e.g., “Necessarily, all donkeys are animals”), and nomological 
necessities (e.g., “Necessarily, donkeys exposed to fire die”); both are, on his view, ways of 
restating certain counterfactual inferences” but that she, “[b]y contrast, think[s] that there is a 
difference in principle between those (nomological) modal claims that license inferences based 
on empirical evidence, and those (metaphysical) modal claims that do so based on conceptual 
competence; there is a difference in our mode of knowledge of each sort of modal” (Thomasson 
2020: 50). But it is unclear why this should amount to a difference ‘in principle’ between these 
two accounts. After all, in this passage Thomasson makes a point about the epistemology of 
modality: whereas knowledge of nomological modal claims is based on empirical evidence, 
knowledge of metaphysical modal claims is based on conceptual competence. But the point in 
Brandom she emphasizes is a logical point. Claims about what is necessary are indeed 
equivalent to claims about what remains true given a set of counterfactual suppositions. The 
different flavours of necessity (e.g. ‘physical’ or ‘metaphysical’ necessity) then correspond to 
the different sets of counterfactual suppositions under which the claim remains true. But this 
logical point is perfectly compatible with the epistemological point, which Brandom does not 
need to deny, that our epistemic access to nomological modal claims might be different from 
our epistemic access to metaphysical modal claims. 
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A second point concerns Thomasson’s methodological recommendations. Thomasson re-
describes the study of metaphysics as a combination of (1) a descriptive conceptual enterprise, 
defending traditional methods such as conceptual analysis and the use of intuitions, and (2) a 
revisionary conceptual enterprise, arguing that we can have substantial discussions about which 
terms or concepts we ought to use (given certain purposes). As regards (1), she notes that 
‘conceptual analysis’ should not be understood too narrowly in terms of breaking down 
concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In this context she refers to Strawson’s 
notion of a ‘connective analysis’, which “aimed at understanding the inferential relations and 
connections among our concepts” (Thomasson 2020: 197). But Strawson’s notion of a 
connective analysis is a bit more interesting than just that. Although it is true that the aim of a 
connective analysis is not to reduce one (set of) concept(s) to another (set of) concept(s), it still 
aims at unearthing a set of fundamental concepts, i.e. concepts the mastery of which is always 
already presupposed whenever one masters another (set of) concept(s). Some examples 
Strawson discusses include the idea that mastering the concept of experience presupposes a 
grasp of the concepts of space, time (slogan: ‘an experience is an experience of something 
somewhere and somewhen’), and objectivity (slogan: ‘a grasp of how things ‘appear’ to me 
presupposes a grasp of how things objectively ‘are’’), or the claim that a grasp of the concept 
of a private particular (a pain or sensation) presupposes a prior grasp of the concept of a person 
to whom such particulars can be ascribed. Such a kind of more systematic conceptual enterprise, 
which Strawson calls ‘descriptive metaphysics’ (as opposed to what he calls ‘revisionary 
metaphysics’ – note the parallel with Thomasson’s division), is not discussed by Thomasson, 
but would definitely deserve a place in Thomasson’s portrayal of a future metaphysics that is 
demystified and re-interpreted as a conceptual enterprise. 
Norms and Necessity is an ambitious and important philosophical work, written in Thomasson’s 
characteristically clear and lucid writing style. It is destined to have a huge impact not only on 
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contemporary debates about modality, but also on our general self-understanding as 
philosophers. 
 
 
